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INTRODUCTION

Despite the great proportion of workplace-related litigation in Brazil,1
employment discrimination litigation is almost nonexistent, which is in
sharp contrast to what happens in the United States. In the United States,
employment discrimination cases correspond to 43.6% of all labor and
employment litigation in federal trial courts.2 On the other hand, I have
seen very few cases of discrimination throughout my practice as a labor
judge in Brazil,3 and that is the general perception in the Labor courts. Is it
because Brazilian law effectively prevents discrimination from happening?
Is it because, for some reason, these cases do not even reach the courts? If
the latter is true, how can Brazil improve enforcement of antidiscrimination policies?
Through its focus on gender discrimination, this paper argues that,
although such discrimination does exist in Brazil, it is not significantly
litigated because:
(A) There are other easier-to-litigate causes of action with
satisfactory remedies;
(B) The lack of more aggressive truth-finding procedures hinders
the uncovering of essential evidence;
(C) Money judgments are proportionally smaller and may not
compensate litigating the more complex cases; and
(D) The current statutory text and the lack of binding precedent
limit the litigation possibilities.

This paper also argues that such issues could be partly resolved by
adopting a new anti-discrimination bill currently pending in the Brazilian
Congress, through an increased focus of prosecutors on gender
discrimination and by gender equality information campaigns.4
Part II provides some background, summarizing the relevant
constitutional and statutory provisions, which shows that Brazil does have
1.
To illustrate the proportion of the litigation in Brazil related to workplace law, the Labor
Justice (Justiça do Trabalho), segment of the Brazilian Judiciary that has such subject matter
jurisdiction, receives 21.3% of the Judiciary’s budget and has 20.5% of the 16,429 Brazilian judges. See
CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA, JUSTIÇA EM NÚMEROS,32, 34 (2014) (Braz.) [hereinafter JUSTICE IN
NUMBERS]. Although the Labor Justice’s pending cases amount to 8.3% (7.8 million) of the national
cases in absolute numbers, the labor cases generally join several claims, whereas the other segments of
the Judiciary often deal with single claim cases. Thus, it is fair to estimate labor and employment cases
in Brazil as roughly one fifth of the actual workload in courts. Id. at 35.
2.

See infra note 70 and accompanying text.

3.

Since 2007, acting in the labor courts of a state capital and of several midsize and small

4.

Lei No. 6.653, de 15 de Dezembro de 2009, PROJETO DE LEI [P.L.] de 16.12.2009 (Braz.).

cities.
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laws against gender discrimination. Part III answers the first question
above in the negative, finding that gender discrimination in Brazil exists in
proportion equal to or superior to that of the United States, despite that such
cases are rarely litigated. As to the second question, the answer is
affirmative: cases are rarely litigated because there are factors that prevent
most of the discrimination victims from suing. Without the intention of
exhausting this complex inquiry, Part IV proposes four explanations to the
issue.
First, Brazilian legislation grants other easier-to-litigate causes of
action and remedies that will otherwise compensate the gender
discrimination victim, thereby reducing the focus on gender discrimination
theories.5 Second, the lack of more aggressive evidence gathering
procedures such as those present in the United States makes it more
difficult to prove discrimination cases in Brazil. 6 Third, the lower damages
usually awarded in Brazil do not provide a large enough incentive to litigate
discrimination cases, unlike in the United States where the monetary
incentives are great.7 Last, the current anti-discrimination statutory text in
Brazil is more limited in scope than American anti-discrimination law.8 As
a possible course of action to address the problem, Part V proposes the
passing of a bill that is waiting to be voted on by the Brazilian Congress
since 2009.9 It also proposes an increased focus on gender discrimination
by public prosecutors who have special discovery powers not available to
private attorneys.10 Finally, it argues for the promotion of campaigns to
increase awareness about workplace gender discrimination among
employers and employees.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS ON GENDER
EQUALITY IN BRAZIL

A. Gender Equality and the Protection of Motherhood in the Brazilian
Constitution
While the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution
limits only state action,11 the Brazilian Constitution grants equality and
5.

See infra notes 99–112 and accompanying text.

6.

See infra notes 113–26 and accompanying text.

7.

See infra notes 128–33 and accompanying text.

8.

See infra Part II, Section B.

9.

See infra notes 142–48 and accompanying text.

10.

See infra notes 149–52 and accompanying text.

11.
“No state shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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other civil and social rights as causes of action both against the government
and private entities.12 The 1988 Constitution contains an extensive and
detailed enumeration of rights.13 For instance, it grants civil rights and
liberties (art. 5), as well as social rights (arts. 6–11), with special attention
to employment and labor rights. 14
As to equality, the Brazilian Constitution forbids discrimination
without limitation to an explicit list of protected classes. It states as a
“fundamental objective” of the country to “promote the well-being of all,
without prejudice as to origin, race, sex, color, age and any other forms of
discrimination.”15 It also prescribes that “the law shall punish any
discrimination violating fundamental rights and liberties.” 16

12.
Alice Monteiro de Barros, DISCRIMINAÇÃO NO EMPREGO POR MOTIVO DE SEXO
[EMPLOYMENT DISCTIMINATION BASED ON GENDER], DISCRIMINAÇÃO [DISCRIMINATION] 59, 66
(RENAULT, VIANA, & CANTELLI eds., 2d ed., 2010) (Braz.). On a historical note, in the 20th century,
Brazil has adopted five different constitutions—in 1934, 1937, 1946, 1967, and in 1988. Id. The
Constitutions of 1934, 1946, 1967 and 1988 all forbade different wages for equal work on the basis of
sex. Id. The 1937 one, despite having an equal protection clause, did not explicitly prohibited gender
based wage differences (as the other ones did), which opened the way for the enactment of the
presidential “decree-law” 2.548, in 1940. Id. Such decree authorized employers to pay women lower
wages than men by 10%. Id. That is a reminder of why Brazil and other Latin American countries tend
to enact long and detailed bill of rights in their Constitutions: to use the harder-to-change Constitution
to protect social advancements, such as gender equality, from future attempts to eliminate them.
13.
See generally CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] pmbl. (Braz.). The
creation of rights and protections for the citizens spreads through almost half of its 250 articles, along
with detailed government structuring, checks and balances. Id. The 1988 Constitution was an attempt
to reorganize the Brazilian legal system after twenty years of authoritarian military rule, and to make
sure that democracy and the respect for civil and social rights would endure. See generally C.F. pmbl.;
see also C.F., translated in BRAZIL’S CONSTITUTION OF 1988 WITH AMENDMENTS THROUGH 2014
(Keith S. Rosenn ed., Constitute Project, 2014). All the transcribed text of the Brazilian constitution
hereinafter is quoted from Keith Rosenn’s version in English, except for some eventual different word
choices, by the author, based on the original text in Portuguese.
14.
C.F. arts. 5, 6–11. Although article 6 lists as social rights “education, health, nutrition,
work, housing, leisure, security, social security, protection of motherhood and childhood, and assistance
to the destitute,” articles 7 through 11 show a special concern with employment and labor rights. C.F.
art. 6–11. Despite the fact that many of these prescribed rights granting provisions could not
immediately generate public policy, due to budget limitations, they still went beyond the mere
aspirational aspect. According to most accepted Brazilian constitutional scholars, all constitutional
provisions have immediate force, at least to command consistent interpretation of present legislation, to
repeal inconsistent legislation, and to guide future legislation and policy making. See, e.g., Luís Roberto
Barroso, Here, There, and Everywhere: Human Dignity in Contemporary Law and in the Transnational
Discourse, 35 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 331, 356 (2012).
15.

C.F. art. 3, § IV. (emphasis added).

16.

C.F. art. 5, § XLI.
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There is special attention to gender equality, as “men and women have
equal rights and duties under the terms of this Constitution.” 17 However,
such attention is not limited to prohibiting discrimination; it also grants
some rights specifically to women, attempting to provide for substantive
equality.18 The Constitution grants “maternity leave without loss of job or
wages for a period of one hundred and twenty days,” and forbids discharge
without cause from the date the pregnancy is confirmed until five months
after birth.19 Finally, the Constitution grants “protection of the job market
for women through specific incentives, as provided by law;” 20 and the
“prohibition of any difference in pay in performance of duties and in hiring
criteria by reason of sex, age, color or marital status.”21

17.

C.F. art. 5, § I.

18.
See C.F. art. 7. One important observation is that this equality is not absolute, being
subordinate to the other guidelines prescribed by the Constitution. Among Brazilian scholars and case
law it is agreed that the equality here is substantive (isonomia material), and not merely formal
(isonomia formal), thus allowing affirmative actions or reverse discrimination to level the playing field
and eliminating effects of past discrimination. Cf. Christopher DiSchino, Affirmative Action in Brazil:
Reverse Discrimination and the Creation of a Constitutionally Protected Color-Line, 17 U. MIAMI
INT’L. & COMP. L. REV. 155, 174 (2010) (citing S.T.J.J., Ap. No. 2003/0151040-1, Relator: Min. Luiz
Fux, 10.02.2004, 182, REVISTA DO SUPERIOR TRIBUNAL DE JUSTICA [R.S.T.J.] 120 de 25.02.2004
(Braz.)) (citing decision of the Superior Tribunal of Justice, S.T.J., upholding the constitutionality of a
quota system in state universities, reasoning that affirmative action is a “‘legitimate human interest’ in
line with the constitutional principle of isonomia, or equality under the law, which mandates
compensation for past discrimination that created current racial inequalities”).
19.
C.F. art. 7, § XVIII; ATO DAS DISPOSIÇÕES CONSTITUCIONAIS TRANSITÓRIAS [A.D.C.T.]
[TRANSITIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ACT] art. 10, § II(b) (Braz.). Besides the for cause
discharge, the literal text actually creates another exception, a discharge that is not “arbitrary.” Id.
However, because no statute yet defines what would be a non arbitrary discharge as to pregnant
employees, the courts have been ruling that the only exception to this tenure rule is the for cause
discharge based on the disciplinary violations in article 482 of the Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho.
Decreto No. 5.452, de 1 de Maio de 1943, CONSOLIDAÇÃO DAS LEIS DO TRABALHO [C.L.T.] art. 482 de
1.5.1943 (Braz.); MAURÍCIO GODINHO DELGADO, CURSO DE DIREITO DO TRABALHO 1, 1167 (3d ed.
2004).
20.
C.F. art. 7, § XX. This provision not only authorizes affirmative action and other policies
to eliminate gender based discrimination, but actually mandates the branches of government to act,
legislating or creating programs that will reach such result. Id. However, despite some legislative
efforts, see infra Part II, Section B, the results are clearly insufficient, as Part III below demonstrates.
21.

C.F. art. 7, § XXX.
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B. Statutory Provisions Relating to Gender Equality and Protection of
Motherhood in Brazil and the United States
At the statutory level, Law 9.029/95 is the functional equivalent to
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).22 It prohibits
discriminatory practices restricting “access or maintenance of an
employment relationship because of sex, origin, race, color, marital status,
family status or age.” 23 Such protected classes are similar to the ones in
Title VII, except for the omission of religion and the inclusion of age.24
Brazilian law considers it a discriminatory practice to require statements or
medical exams regarding sterilization, pregnancy status, or to inducement
of birth control.25 Additionally, notwithstanding other available relief, it
gives the wrongfully discharged employee the option to be reinstated with
back pay, or not to be reinstated and receive doubled back pay.26
Further, Law 9.799/99 amends the Consolidation of Labor Laws
(C.L.T.) to refine the list of unlawful discriminatory practices, such as
prohibiting the use of protected classes when advertising jobs and
discharging or refusing employment. 27 The C.L.T allows an exception in
cases where the nature of the activity is “notorious and publicly
incompatible” with such classes, which is loosely equivalent to a bona fide
occupational qualification found in the United States’ own Title VII.28
Additionally, it defines as unlawful the use of those classes as a
determining factor to promote and define compensation and training
opportunities.29 Finally, the statute also clears the way for affirmative
action. It allows temporary measures to promote gender equality, to correct

22.

See infra notes 28–33 and accompanying text.

23.
Lei No. 9.029, de 13 de Abril de 1995, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] art. 1 de
17.4.1995 (Braz.).
24.

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2)(a)(1) (2012).

25.

Lei No. 9.029 D.O.U. art. 2 (Braz.).

26.

Id. art. 4.

27.
Lei No. 9.799, de 26 de Maio de 1999, DIÁRIO O FICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 27.5.1999
(Braz.) (provisions functionally equivalent to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (d)); Decreto No. 5.452,
de 1 de Maio de 1943 CONSOLIDAÇÃO DAS LEIS DO TRABALHO [C.L.T.] art. 373-A (Braz.).
28.
Decreto No. 5.452 C.L.T. art. 373-A, § I (Braz.). According to Title VII, in the United
States it is not an unlawful employment practice to make employment decisions on the basis of
someone’s religion, sex, or national origin when these are a “bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.” 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(e).
29.

Decreto No. 5.452 C.L.T. art. 373-A, §§ I–III (Braz.).
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the distortions that affect training, access to employment, and working
conditions of women. 30
In the United States, Title VII addresses gender discrimination.31 Title
VII defines several important terms used throughout the Act and clarifies
that discrimination “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” includes but is
not limited to discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.32 It regulates
unlawful employment practices, such as to discharge, refuse to hire or
otherwise “discriminate against an individual with respect to […] terms
[…] of employment because of this individual’s […] sex”, or other listed
protected class.33 However, Title VII allows an employer to make
employment decisions based on a protected class if it is a “bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
that particular business […].”34 It also regulates disparate impact, where a
particular practice causes disparate impact on the basis of a protected class
and the respondent fails to demonstrate that such class is a business
necessity, or refuses to adopt an alternative practice.35 Finally, among other
important provisions, Title VII forbids retaliation against individuals
because they opposed unlawful employment practices, or participated in
any proceeding under Title VII. 36
Though Brazilian legislation forbids gender discrimination, it confers
certain benefits to women for their maternal roles, as a means to protect
family and to compensate for the disadvantages women suffer in the
workplace due to childbearing.37 For instance, women in Brazil are entitled
to paid maternity leave of 120 days. 38 It is a social security benefit, where
30.

Id. art. 373-A, sole para.

31.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e.

32.

Id. § 2000e(k).

33.

Id. § 2000e-2(a).

34.

Id. § 2000e-2(e)(1).

35.

Id. § 2000e-2(k).

36.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).

37.
See DELGADO, supra note 19, at 781. After the 1988 Constitution, some previous
provisions deemed excessively restrictive, paternalistic or discriminatory to women were repealed,
while protections related to motherhood remained. Id. For instance, Law 7,855/1989 repealed statutory
provisions authorizing the father or husband to interfere in an adult woman’s employment contract,
demanding that women went through certain medical examinations, and limiting women in certain types
of work. Id. That followed international trends, where excessive state intervention was regarded as a
cause of discrimination by employers and as an obstacle for the progress of women in the labor market.
See Eduardo Gabriel Saad, Da Proteção do Trabalho da Mulher [Protection of Women’s Work], in
CONSOLIDAÇÃO DAS LEIS DO TRABALHO COMENTADA 1, 458 (JOSÉ EDUARDO DUARTE SAAD & ANA
MARIA SAAD CASTELO BRANCO eds., 47th ed., 2014) (Braz.).
38.

C.F. art. 7, § XVIII; Decreto No. 5.452, de 1 de Maio de 1943, CONSOLIDAÇÃO DAS LEIS
392 de 01.05.1943 (Braz.).

DO TRABALHO [C.L.T.] art.
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the employer directly pays the usual wages to the employee but
compensates the corresponding amount with other social security taxes
owed.39 Additionally, women have tenure from the date the pregnancy is
confirmed until five months after birth.40 This temporary job security
allows the returning employee to have her job back, which otherwise would
have been likely filled, and at least a month to show her value at work.
Women may also benefit from unlimited paid sick days or disability
leave.41 Even though this benefit is also available to men, it proves to be
very important for women with pregnancy complications. 42 Finally,
without loss of wages and other rights, pregnant women have the right to be
accommodated to another position when health conditions so require, as
long as they are restored to the previous position after maternity leave. 43
In contrast, there is no paid maternity leave mandated in the United
States at the federal level, and only a few American states have enacted
some form of paid maternity leave. 44 The Family and Medical Leave Act
(F.M.L.A.) grants an unpaid leave of eighty-four days (twelve weeks).45
Though the F.M.L.A. does not provide a pregnant woman with job security,

39.
Lei No. 8.213, de 24 de julho de 1991, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] art. 71–73 de
25.7.1991 (Braz.). Despite being a great conquest of society on behalf motherhood, paid maternity
leave was itself a cause of discrimination. Until the seventies, funding maternity leave was a great
burden to the employer. Employers then tried to avoid such burden by not hiring married women, and it
was not uncommon for women that got married to hide it from their employers. That only changed with
the enactment of Law 6,136/1974, which turned paid maternity leave into a social security benefit. Id.
art. 71. Thereafter, there was a considerable increase of women participation in the labor market. See
Saad, supra note 37, at 467.
40.
Decreto No. 5.452 C.L.T. art. 391-A (Braz.) (referencing ATO DAS DISPOSIÇÕES
CONSTITUCIONAIS TRANSITÓRIAS [A.D.C.T.] art. 10, § II(b) (Braz.)).
41.
Lei No. 8.213 D.O.U. art. 60, § 3 (Braz). The employer, upon a showing of medical
examination documents, pays up to fifteen consecutive days, and the days thereafter are paid as a social
security benefit. Id. That is not without some friction between employees and employers, who
complain that some employees abuse of such right.
42.

43.

Id.
Art. 60. Paid sick leave [auxílio-doença, literally, sickness aid] will be due to the
insured employee from the sixteenth day of removal from the activity, and, in the
case of other insured persons, from the date of the beginning of the incapacity as
long as he remains incapacitated . . . §3 During the first fifteen consecutive days
following the departure of the activity due to illness, the company will be
responsible for paying the insured employee his full salary. Id.
Decreto No. 5.452 C.L.T. art. 392, § 4 (Braz.).

44.
29 U.S.C. § 2612(c) (2009); see Adrienne Lu, Paid Family Leave Now Law in N.J., THE
PHILA. INQUIRER (May 3, 2008), http://articles.philly.com/2008-05-03/news/24989936_1_philipkirschner-paid-family-leave-weeks-of-unpaid-family.
45.

29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A).
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at least she is entitled to the same position held before taking leave.46
Additionally, a discharge shortly after an F.M.L.A. leave would raise a
strong case of interference with F.M.L.A. rights, entitling the employee to
reinstatement, damages, attorney’s fees and costs. 47 As to the period prior
to the leave, a discharged pregnant woman would have to go through the
difficult task of proving employment discrimination in American courts. 48
C.

Prospective Anti-Discrimination Legislation

There is a bill, P.L. 6.653/09, for a more comprehensive antidiscrimination statute waiting to be voted on in the Brazilian House of
Representatives (Câmara dos Deputados) since 2009.49 Despite the special
attention to gender discrimination, its coverage is broad, expressing a nonexhaustive list of protected classes. It prohibits all discriminatory treatment
“between women and men, based on gender, sexual orientation, race,
ethnicity, racial origin, age, origin, physical appearance, health status,
disability, political opinions, membership of political parties and trade
unions, customs, religious beliefs, among others.” 50
P.L. 6.653/09 defines discriminatory practices broadly as any actions
based on differential treatment,51 and defines indirect discrimination
(resembling Title VII’s definition of disparate impact52) as:
an attitude, criteria, provision or policy that, despite apparently
neutral, put female or male workers in comparative disadvantage,
except for acts justified by the performance of different functions
in the company's hierarchy, or as affirmative actions to
compensate for an uneven situation and achieve equality of
treatment.53

P.L. 6.653/09 also mandates affirmative actions to compensate and
ensure equality between women and men.54 It requires policies for sharing
and balancing work and family responsibilities, and for establishing training
46.

Id. § 2614(a)(1) (2008).

47.

Id. §§ 2615(a)(1), 2617(a)(1), (3) (2008).

48.

See infra notes 103–05 and accompanying text.

49.
(Braz.).

Lei No. 6.653/09, de 15 de Dezembro de 2009, PROJETO DE LEI [P.L.] de 16.12.2009

50.

Id. art. 2, § 1.

51.

Id. art. 4.

52.

See supra note 35 and accompanying text.

53.

Lei No. 6.653/09 P.L. art. 4, sole para.

54.

Id. art. 2, § 3, art. 3.
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and grievance procedures related to sexual harassment and bullying. 55 It
also attempts to deter discriminatory behavior through the denial of public
financing and exposure of employers, who violate those policies, in a
publicized list. 56 Additionally, P.L. 6.653/09 defines workplace bullying as
“any improper conduct that is repetitive and prolonged, exposing female
and male workers to humiliating and embarrassing situations, violating their
dignity and psychological integrity, affecting the directly offended person's
work and the group’s productivity as a result of the deterioration of the
working environment.” 57
Finally, P.L. 6.653/09 innovates by mandating employers to create
internal commissions for the promotion of equality, composed equally of
employees elected by their peers and employees nominated by the
employer.58 Its members would be tenured for up to one year after
finishing their one-year term.59 Additionally, they would have powers to
disseminate equality information, to create an Equality Plan, and to check
the employer’s compliance with the plan, as well as all pertinent
administrative regulations.60
III.
DESPITE BEING RARELY LITIGATED IN BRAZIL, GENDER
DISCRIMINATION DOES EXIST IN PROPORTIONS EQUIVALENT OR SUPERIOR
TO THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES
A.

Gender-Based Employment Discrimination in Brazil is Seldom
Litigated

Despite the fact that approximately one-fifth of all litigation in Brazil
relates to the workplace,61 the number of gender-based employment
discrimination claims that reach the labor courts is minimal.62 Although
55.

Id. art. 5, arts. 25–26.

56.

Id. arts. 23–24.

57.

Id. art. 27.

58.

Lei No. 6.653/09 P.L art. 34.

59.

Id.

60.

Id.

61.

JUSTICE IN NUMBERS, supra note 1, at 35.

62.
The [Brazilian] Judiciary consists of: (I) the Supreme Federal Tribunal [S.T.F.];
(I-A) the National Council of Justice [C.N.J.]; (II) the Superior Tribunal of Justice
[S.T.J]; (III) the Federal Regional Tribunals and the Federal Judges; (IV) the
Labor Tribunals and the Labor Judges; (V) the Electoral Tribunals and the
Electoral Judges; (VI) the Military Tribunals and the Military Judges; (VII) the
Tribunals and Judges of the states, the Federal District and the Territories. C.F.
art. 92, §§ I–VII.
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there are no statistics specific to such employment discrimination cases, it is
possible to arrive at such conclusion looking at the number of cases
identified by topics or legal issues where employment discrimination might
be contained. An eloquent illustration is the following 2014 data from the
highest Brazilian labor court:63

Code
2697
55184
2656
1723

Issues that might contain employment T.S.T.
discrimination causes of action
Quantity

T.S.T.
%

10,706
4,146
2,888
2,351

4.0%
1.5%
1.1%
0.9%

2,094

0.8%

1,066

0.4%

680

0.3%

55193

Salary differences due to equal pay mandate
Salary differences due to denied promotion
Reinstatement, readmission or front pay
Moral damages due to moral harassment
Indirect discharge (fault committed by
employer)
Reinstatement, readmission or front pay due to
pregnancy job security
Salary differences due to equal pay mandate
(bank workers)
Void discharge

502

0.2%

55216

Collective moral damages

446

0.2%

9051

Moral damages due to void for cause discharge
Discriminatory discharge (may include
retaliation for all employment suits, but not
only for employment discrimination)

351

0.1%

339

0.1%

2435
1978
55028

1966

The Labor Court System consists of: (I) the Superior Labor Tribunal [situated in
the national capital, last instance for issues of workplace law, except for
constitutional challenges, when its decisions may be subject of extraordinary
appeals to the Supreme Federal Tribunal, S.T.F.]; (II) Regional Labor Tribunals
[appellate labor court, usually one per state capital]; (III) Labor Judges. C.F. art.
111, §§ I–III.
In Brazil, labor courts are responsible for adjudging: (I) actions arising from
work relations (either employment relations or individual independent contractors
working for another enterprise); (II) actions involving the right to strike; (III)
actions concerning union representation; (IV) writs of mandamus, habeas corpus
and habeas data (access to information suits) within this subject matter; (V)
jurisdictional conflicts among labor courts; (VI) economic or non-economic
damage claims stemming from work relations; (VII) claims relating to
administrative penalties imposed by labor inspection agencies; (VIII) collection
of payroll social contributions and related fines; (IX) other controversies
stemming from work relations, as provided by law. C.F. art. 114, §§ I–IX.
63.
TRIBUNAL S UPERIOR DO TRABALHO [T.S.T.], COORDENADORIA DE ESTASTÍSTICA E
PESQUISA DO, ACERVO POR ASSUNTO, de 31.12.2014 (Braz.) [hereinafter T.S.T. STATISTICS].
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55214

Moral damages due to discriminatory action

313

0.1%

55082

242

0.1%

207

0.1%

80

0.0%

63

0.0%

8812

Women (especially protected worker)
Moral damages due to body or personal
belongings search
Moral damages due to sexual harassment
Moral damages due to restricting the use of
restroom
Maternity-leave salary

30

0.0%

55331

Maternity leave

14

0.0%

55421
1724
55417

Out of the 270,424 cases before the T.S.T. in 2014,64 the cases that
actually involve gender-based employment discrimination, might be less
than 0.5%.65 Despite the fact that the sum of the percentages in the table
above would nominally reach 9.8% of the total, several claims are usually
joined in the same complaint, and none relate exclusively to employment
discrimination.66 Discounting such situations, employment discrimination
cases could be estimated at about 1% of the litigation in labor courts.67
Gender-based discrimination (presumably not more than half of such cases)
are likely not more than 0.5% of the labor courts’ workload.68 Therefore,
employment discrimination suits correspond to no more than 0.48% of the
total federal litigation in Brazil, and gender-based discrimination suits to no
more than 0.24%.69
64.
See generally Cesar Zucatti Pritsch, The Brazilian Appellate Procedure Through Common
Law Lenses: How American Standards of Review May Help Improve Brazilian Civil Procedure, 48 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 56 (2017) (discussing the amazing quantity of appeals handled by the
Brazilian appellate courts, and possible tools to reduce them)
65.

As covered in Title VII, see supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text.

66.
See supra note 64–65 and accompanying text. For instance, “salary differences due to
equal pay mandate” might be due to gender or race discrimination, but often they are not. See T.S.T.
STATISTICS, supra note 63. An employee who has been hired for a certain function at a certain wage,
might end up performing more complex activities without receiving the correspondent wage increase. If
another employee earns more for equivalent work (despite equivalent seniority), the employer is liable
for this salary difference even without the intention to discriminate because of this employee’s protected
class status. In another example, the denial of a promotion might be unlawful due to discrimination, but
it also may stem from a mere violation of a seniority agreements.
67.
See supra note 63 and accompanying text. Since there is no separate employment
discrimination cases statistics in Brazil, the author used his professional experience to break up the
available numbers into an estimate of the discrimination cases within such numbers.
68.

Id.

69.
Id. In 2013, the labor intermediate appellate courts handled 648,478 appeals while the
federal intermediate appellate courts handled 499,244 appeals. CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA,
JUSTIÇA EM NÚMEROS 2014 ANO-BASE 2013: JUSTIÇA DO TRABALHO, [THE JUDICIARY IN NUMBERS
2014 BASED ON 2013: LABOR JUSTICE] 108 (2013) (Braz.) [hereinafter JUDICIARY IN NUMBERS 2013];
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In sharp contrast, the proportion of employment discrimination cases
in the United States is much higher. Employment discrimination amounts
to 3.7% of federal litigation (7.6 times more than in Brazil) and 43.6% of
all labor and employment federal cases (proportionally 43.6 times more
than in Brazil). 70 There are no specific statistics when it comes to gender
discrimination claims in the American courts. However, the proportion of
the gender discrimination charges to the total of discrimination charges
filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (E.E.O.C.) may
provide some insight. 71 Assuming that discrimination complaints are filed
in federal courts in similar proportions to those in the E.E.O.C., gender
discrimination claims are 30% of the employment discrimination litigation,
and 13.8% of the federal labor and employment litigation.72 Therefore,
gender discrimination in the United States is twenty-five times more
litigated than in the Brazilian labor courts.
B.

Gender Discrimination in the Labor Market in Brazil

Looking at the very low numbers of employment discrimination
litigation in Brazil, one could think that Brazil is free of discrimination, but
that is still distant from reality. Women correspond to 76% of male
individuals in the labor force (in the United States, women make up 85% of
male idividuals in the labor force).73 Despite being more educated than
CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA, J USTIÇA EM NÚMEROS 2014: JUSTIÇA FEDERAL [THE JUDICIARY IN
NUMBERS 2014: FEDERAL J USTICE] 77 (2013) (Braz.) [hereinafter J UDICIARY IN NUMBERS 2014].
Thus, labor appeals were 57% of the total federal litigation at appellate courts. See JUDICIARY IN
NUMBERS 2014, supra note 69; J UDICIARY IN NUMBERS 2013, supra note 69.
70.
Considering the total numbers of tables D and C-2, in the fiscal year of 2014 there were a
total of 372,542 cases pending at the U.S. District Courts, and the employment discrimination cases are
in table C-2 under the labels “Civil Rights: Employment”, and “Civil Rights: ADA-Employment,”
which totaled 13,881 cases in the fiscal year 2014. See U.S. COURTS, Table D. Cases: U.S. Dist.
Courts—Criminal Cases Commenced, Terminated, and Pending (Including Transfers) During the 12Month Periods Ending June 30, 2013 and 2014, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files
/statistics_import_dir/D00CJun14.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2017); see U.S. COURTS, Table C-2. U.S. Dist.
Courts—Civil Cases Commenced, by Basis of Jurisdiction and Nature of Suit, During the 12-Month
Periods Ending June 30, 2013 and 2014, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics
_import_dir/C02Jun14.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2017) (explaining 13,881 employment discrimination
cases out of a total of 31,858 labor and employment cases—“Civil Rights: Employment”, “Civil Rights:
ADA-Employment,” and “Labor Laws, Total”).
71.
Charge Statistics (Charges filed with EEOC) FY 1997 Through FY 2014, U.S. EQUAL
EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov//eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last
visited Oct. 3, 2017).
72.

Id.

73.
WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 497 (Klaus Schwab, ed.,
2013). On a comparative note, one would think that a higher participation of women in the labor market
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men, women earn less.74 Women earned only 65% of what men earned in
2000, 68% in 2010, 72.8% in 2012 and 73.7% in 2013.75 This shows a
trend to reduce the gap, but there is still a great disparity.76 That becomes
especially clear in comparison to the United States, where in 2012 women’s
median weekly earnings were 81% compared to those of men.77 Curiously,
among the better-educated segment, the difference in Brazil is higher.78
is an indicator of a more progressive or developed society, and of better working conditions and wages
for women. However, statistics show that a higher ratio is not a good proxy for the development of the
country, because there are developed and developing countries which fall above and below the United
States and Brazil when it comes to the ratio of women to men in the labor force. See id. For instance:
Mozambique 1.05; Rwanda 1.02; Norway 0.94; Cambodia 0.93; Kazakhstan and Canada 0.91;
Botswana 0.90; China 0.88; Germany 0.86; Zambia 0.85; U.S. 0.86; Angola and Spain 0.82; Peru 0.81;
Singapore and Brazil 0.76; Japan 0.74; Greece 0.73; Italy 0.69; Chile 0.66; Mexico 0.56; Turkey 0.40;
India 0.36; Egypt 0.32 and Algeria 0.21. Id.
74.
See INSTITUTO BRASILEIRO DE GEOGRAFIA E ESTATÍSTICA, ESTATÍSTICAS DE GÊNERO:
UMA ANÁLISE DOS RESULTADOS DO CENSO DEMOGRÁFICO 2010 [GENDER STATISTICS: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE 2010 DEMOGRAPHIC CENSUS RESULTS] 33, Gráfico [Graffic] 28 (2014) (Braz.). In 2010, among
Brazilians between 18 and 24 years old, 41.1% of men had dropped out of high school, but only 31.9%
of women did the same, and while only 11.3% of men attended college, 15.1% of women did so. Id.
Among women of 25 years old and above, 12.5% had completed a college education, but only 9.9% of
men in such age group did the same. Id.
75.
Id. at Tabela [Table] 26. This illustrates another major type of employment discrimination
in Brazil—discrimination based on race. See id. Despite the celebrated notion that Brazil is a “racial
democracy,” blacks and other dark-skinned citizens usually receive inferior opportunities in life and
have limited access to higher paying jobs. See, e.g., Benjamin Hensler, Não Vale a Pena? (Not Worth
the Trouble?) Afro-Brazilian Workers and Brazilian Anti-Discrimination Law, 30 HASTINGS INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 267, 270 (2007) (arguing that this “racial democracy” ideology has actually been harmful
to Afro-Brazilians, both disadvantaging their attempts to challenge discrimination in the courts, and
handicapping their collective efforts to develop a broader grass-roots movement for racial equality).
INSTITUTO BRASILEIRO DE GEOGRAFIA E ESTATÍSTICA, PESQUISA NACIONAL POR AMOSTRA DE
DOMICÍLOS: SÍNTESE DE INDICADORES 2014 [NATIONAL S URVEY ON HOUSEHOLD SAMPLES:
SNYTHESIS OF INDICATORS 2014] 71 (2015) (Braz.).
76.
At the lower end of the wage spectrum, for example, only 21.1% of the occupied men
earned the Brazilian minimum wage, whereas that rate was 29.8% for women. Id.
77.
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WOMEN IN LABOR FORCE: A
DATABOOK REPORT 1049, 2 (2014).
78.
Women with up to 8 years of schooling earn 71.4% of men’s wages, but that ratio is
68.7% for 9–11 years of education, and 66.1% for 12 or more years of education. ANA LUCIA SABOIA,
CAPACITAÇÃO PARA OS MECANISMOS DE GÊNERO NO GOVERNO FEDERAL [TRAINING FOR GENDER
MECHANISMS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT], LIGUE 180 CENTRAL DE ATENDIMENTO À MULHER
[LEAGUE 180 SERVICE CENTER FOR WOMEN] 57 (1st ed., 2014) (Braz.); see also LÉA ELISA
SILINGOWSCHI CALIL, DIREITO DO TRABALHO DA MULHER: A QUESTÃO DA I GUALDADE J URÍDICA
ANTI A DESIGUALDADE FÁTICA [WOMEN’S LABOR LAW: THE QUESTION OF LEGAL EQUALITY
AGAINST FACIAL INEQUALITY] 110–11 (2007). Such trend does not occur in the United States, where
women with less than a high school diploma earn 76% of what men do, but women with a high school
diploma or more earned 78% of men’s compensation. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 77, at 59–60.
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Explanations for the wage gap in Brazil are not clear. Common sense
would suggest that cheap child-care and paid pregnancy leave would reduce
the disadvantages of Brazilian women in the workplace, thereby reducing
the wage gap. 79 However, the smaller wage difference in United States—
where such benefits are not mandated by law—negates such an
assumption.80 While examining “family life” variables, a commentator
found that maternity or marriage, by itself, was not as determinant as the
hours actually spent performing domestic tasks, which disproportionately
burden women and greatly affect income.81 In 2003, Brazilian women
dedicated a weekly average of 24 hours to domestic tasks—while men, only
10 hours.82 In 2012, this burden was slightly smaller, with 21 weekly hours
for women and the same 10 hours for men.83 Those hours reflect the gender
roles perpetuated in Brazilian culture, where it is often the woman’s duty to
care for children and the elderly.84 Even for upper-class women, who
generally hire someone else to perform these tasks, this lesser-paid
domestic work is performed by another woman, contributing to the wage
gap.85
Another possible explanation for the wage gap is a horizontal
differentiation of work based on the notion of “masculine” or “feminine”
jobs in Brazilian culture. 86 Taking college majors as an illustration of such
gender-specific job choices, women were 91.3% of the total enrollments in
Pedagogy, 82.9% in Nursing, and 80% in Languages—all lesser-paid areas

79.

See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.

80.

See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text..

81.
Simone Wajnman, Gender Roles in Family and Earnings Differences in Brazil, in
INTERNATIONAL POPULATION CONFERENCE 7–8 (2013).
82.

Id.

83.
Maira Covre Sussai Soares & Jadir Soares Junior, Divisão do Trabalho Doméstico nas
Famílias Brasileiras: Influências de Fatores Individuais e das Políticas Públicas [Division of Domestic
Work in Brazilian Familes: Influences of Individual Factors and Public Policies], in CONFERENCE:
NATIONAL MEETING OF POPULATION STUDIES 5 (2014).
84.
See, e.g., Ancelmo Gois & Cláudio Duarte, Cuidar de Idosos Tira a Mulher do Trabalho
[Caring for the Elderly Takes a Woman Away from Work], O GLOBO (Nov. 15, 2014) (reviewing ANA
AMÉLIA CAMARANO, NOVO REGIME DEMOGRÁFICO: UMA NOVA RELAÇÃO ENTRE POPULAÇÃO E
DESENVOLVIMENTO? [NEW DEMOGRAPHIC REGIME: A NEW RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POPULATION
AND DEVELOPMENT?] (2014) (noting that young children, especially up to two years are still a great
barrier for women at the labor market, but that the aging of the population adds a new barrier: who will
stay home and take care of the elderly, for instance, with Parkinson or Alzheimer)).
85.

CALIL, supra note 78, at 111–12.

86.

Id. at 108–09.
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in Brazil.87 In contrast, Engineering and Computer Science, usually betterpaid areas, proved to be very “masculine,” with only 20.3% and 18.8% of
women enrollment in Brazil.88 Additionally, domestic workers, the least
paid workers in Brazil, are almost exclusively women.89 While 15.5% of
workingwomen are domestic workers, only 0.9% of workingmen perform
such jobs.90
Finally, within the same career or industry there is clearly a vertical
wage differential, or the so-called “glass ceiling.” A survey of the 500
largest corporations in Brazil reveals that women do not usually reach the
highest positions.91 At the executive level, only 13.7% are women.92 That
is similar to the United States, where women hold only 14.6% of executive
positions at Fortune 500 companies.93 The survey in Brazil also shows that
there is no consistent trend of inclusion for women yet. Although executive
level female participation in Brazil rose from 6% (2001) to 13.7% (2010),
at the supervision level women fell from 28% (2003) to 26.8% (2010).94
Finally, the survey shows that there is either a lack of willingness or lack of
management awareness about how to deal with such inequality. Though
55% of the surveyed companies’ presidents acknowledged insufficient
proportion of women in the executive staff, only 4% of them had policies to
incentivize women’s participation.95 Some presidents credited the low
participation of women to the company’s lack of knowledge on how to
handle the matter (49%).96 Others attributed it to the female candidates’

87.
Id. In the middle of the spectrum are Social Communication (Journalism and Public
Relations), Accounting, Business and Law, these proportions were respectively 56.6%, 50.7%, 49.2%
and 41.3% of the numbers of men enrolled. Id.
88.
Id. “Occupational segregation” as to men and women performing different jobs also
occurs in the United States. For instance, over 90% of receptionists, dietitians, nutritionists, registered
nurses, pre-school and kindergarten teachers are female, and over 90% of electrical and mechanical
engineers, firefighters, mechanics, and pest exterminators are male. Kingsley R. Browne, Mind Which
Gap? The Selective Concern over Statistical Sex Disparities, 8 FIU L. REV. 271, 281 (2013).
89.

CALIL, see supra note 78, at 108–09.

90.

Id.

91.

INSTITUTO ETHOS [ETHOS INSTITUTE], SOCIAL, RACIAL AND GENDER PROFILE OF THE 500
BRAZILIAN LARGEST COMPANIES AND THEIR AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS 1, 8 (2010).
92.

Id. at 11.

93.
The 2013 Catalyst Census: Fortune 500 Women Executive Officers and Top Earners,
CATALYST (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/2013-catalyst-census-fortune-500women-executive-officers-and-top-earners.
94.

INSTITUTO ETHOS, supra note 91, at 12.

95.

Id. at 26, 30.

96.

Id. at 30.

2018]

Zucatti Pritsch

527

lack of professional qualification for the position (42%) and to women’s
lack of interest for the positions (9%).97
Therefore, gender-based employment discrimination in Brazil, despite
not being significantly litigated, occurs in proportions equivalent or
superior to those of the United States. Then, why is it that these cases do
not even reach the courts? Part IV will take a closer look.
IV.

WHY ARE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS RARELY LITIGATED?

Part III negatively answered the question as to whether Brazilian law
effectively prevents discrimination from happening. Although rarely
litigated, gender discrimination does exist in numbers equivalent or superior
to those of the United States. If this is the case why are gender
discrimination cases rarely litigated in Brazil? Though the answer is not
clear, this paper argues four possible explanations for the issue:
(A) There are other easier-to-litigate causes of action with
satisfactory remedies;
(B) The lack of more aggressive truth-finding procedures hinders
the uncovering of essential evidence;
(C) Money judgments are proportionally smaller than in the
United States and may not compensate litigating the more
complex cases; and
(D) The current statutory text and the lack of binding precedent
limit the litigation possibilities.

A. Brazilian Legislation Grants Other Easier-to-Litigate Causes of
Action with Reasonable Remedies, Thereby Reducing the Incentives for
Filing a More Complex Claim of Gender Discrimination
While some cases in the United States would be litigated as
employment discrimination claims, the same cases in Brazil may be
brought under other more straightforward causes of action, without having
discriminatory intent. This subsection uses sexual harassment due to the
abusive environment and the discriminatory discharge of a pregnant woman
as examples.
In the United States, in order for a plaintiff to succeed in a sexual
harassment suit due to an abusive work environment there must be a
sufficiently severe or pervasive conduct which offends a reasonable person,
and the conduct was actually perceived as abusive by the plaintiff, affecting

97.

Id.
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her terms of employment because of her sex.98 In Brazil, abusive
environment harassment does not have to be necessarily because of sex but
can be brought under a “moral harassment” claim.99 This claim has been
defined as systematic and frequent psychological violence where someone
tends to isolate the victim through humiliation, undermining his or her
reputation and confidence. 100 It does not only involve action by superiors,
but even among colleagues, and the goal is usually to compel the victim to
resign, retire, take a sick leave or ask for a transfer. 101 Because it is a
broader and easier to establish cause of action, “moral harassment” has
been litigated in Brazil nine times more than discriminatory discharge, and
thirty times more than sexual harassment.102
As to the discriminatory discharge of a pregnant woman, in the United
States there is no job security during pregnancy and relief depends on the
ability to prove discriminatory intent. 103 Proving discriminatory intent in
the United States may be a daunting task. Many of the plaintiffs fail in
summary judgment, where courts often ignore evidence of explicit bias, or
“search for explicitly discriminatory policies and rogue actors […],” which
is a rare paradigm in the twenty-first century.104 Evidence that an action
was taken “because of” gender bias is usually circumstantial.105
On the other hand, in Brazil there is almost an automatic win without
the need to go through the intricacies of discriminatory intent. 106 A
pregnant woman may not be discharged without cause from the date that
98.
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993); but see David C. Yamada, The
Phenomenon of Workplace Bullying and the Need for Status-Blind Hostile Work Environment
Protection, 88 GEO. L.J. 475 (2000) (explaining the harms of workplace harassment in general and
proposing a status-blind ban).
99.
See, e.g., TRT-3 [Tribunal Regional do Trabalho da 3ª Região] [Regional Tribunal of
Labour of the 3rd Region], RO 01292.2003,057.03.00.3, Relatora: Des. Alice Monteiro de Barros,
DIÁRIO DA J USTIÇA DE MINAS GERAIS [D.J.M.G.] [Journal of Justice of Minas Gerais] 13 de 11.08.2004
(Braz.).
100.

Id.

101.

Id.

102.

See supra note 63 and accompanying table.

103. See supra note 48 and accompanying text; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (establishing that
discrimination “because of sex” includes because of “pregnancy, childbirth or related medical condition
. . .”). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a pregnant woman must show that: “(1) she is
a member of a protected class; (2) she was satisfactorily performing her job; (3) she was discharged; and
(4) similarly situated persons not in her protected class were treated more favorably or that her position
was filled by a person who was not pregnant.” See, e.g., Fulkerson v. AmeriTitle, Inc., 64 F. App’x. 63,
65 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).
104.

Nancy Gertner, Losers' Rules, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 111–12 (2012).

105.

Id. at 112.

106.

See supra note 102 and accompanying text..
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the pregnancy is confirmed until five months after the birth.107 If fired at
any point during this tenure period, she has the right to reinstatement and
back pay.108 Additionally, if litigation causes such distress that would
render reinstatement ill-advised, the employee may waive reinstatement and
receive the wages and benefits of the tenure period.109 As opposed to
discrimination litigation, here the employer would not be able to assert a
legitimate non-discriminatory reason as a defense.110 The employer can
only defeat such a claim by showing that the firing was based on a serious
disciplinary violation, as defined in the law. 111 This may help explain why
plaintiffs are four times more likely to sue for reinstatement or front pay
based on pregnancy tenure than on discriminatory discharge, even though
the discriminatory discharge theory allows for doubled back pay. 112
B. The Lack of Aggressive Evidence Gathering Procedures Such as the
Ones in the United States Makes It Much More Difficult to Prove Certain
Discrimination Claims in Brazil
Differences as to the evidence gathering process in Brazil and the
United States may explain in part why, unless there is a “smoking gun”
piece of evidence, discrimination cases are rarely litigated in Brazil. As
will be explained, Brazil’s civil procedure provides fewer means to uncover
circumstantial evidence, which is sometimes the only kind of evidence
available in an employment discrimination case.
In the United States, there are aggressive discovery procedures for the
request of documents,113 of written answers to interrogatories,114as well as
107. ATO DAS DISPOSIÇÕES CONSTITUCIONAIS TRANSITÓRIAS [A.D.C.T.] art. 10, § II(b) (Braz.);
Decreto No. 5.452, de 1 de Maio de 1943, CONSOLIDAÇÃO DAS LEIS DO TRABALHO [C.L.T.] art. 391-A
de 01.05.1943 (Braz.); see also supra note 38.
108. TRIBUNAL S UPERIOR DO TRABALHO [T.S.T], Súmula [Precedent] No. 244, Resolução
[Decision] 185/2012, 14.09.2012, DIÁRIO ELETRÔNICO DA J USTIÇA DO TRABALHO [D.E.J.T.] [Online
Journal of Labour Justice] de 27.09.2012 (Braz.).
109.

Decreto No. 5.452 C.L.T. art. 496 (Braz.).

110.

See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 803 (1973).

111. Decreto No. 5.452 C.L.T. art. 482 (Braz.) (explaining those violations are: (a) acts of
dishonesty; (b) incontinence of conduct or wrongdoing; (c) unfair competition against the employer; (d)
criminal conviction; (e) negligence; (f) habitual intoxication or intoxication during working hours; (g)
violation of trade secrets; (h) indiscipline or insubordination; (i) job abandonment; (j-k) verbal or
physical offenses, except in self-defense or defense of others; (l) constant gambling).
112. See supra note 63 and accompanying table; Lei No. 9.029, de 13 de Abril de 1995, DIÁRIO
OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] art. 4, § II de 17.4.1995 (Braz.).
113.

At the federal level, see FED. R. CIV. P. 33.

114. See id. Although not very suitable for truth finding, interrogatories may be useful to
narrow down factual disputes, saving time and focusing discovery.
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long attorney-led depositions.115 All of these discovery methods increase
the likelihood of uncovering the truth. They are enforced by possibly harsh
procedural sanctions, including contempt of court, disciplinary procedures
prosecuted by the Bar before the courts, and perjury prosecutions. 116 Thus,
there are strong incentives to comply with discovery requests, to turn over
to the other party even the most damaging documents, and to tell the truth
in interrogatories or depositions.
In Brazil, there is less enforcement of this truth-finding process.
Successful perjury convictions are rare, as police departments’ and
prosecutors’ scarce resources are not prioritized for the prosecution of
perjury, and courts have developed lenient precedents as to perjury to
manage overburdened dockets.117 Parties in Brazil are not considered
witnesses, and thus cannot even be prosecuted for perjury. 118 There is also
no imprisonment for contempt of court. 119 Parties that lie might be fined as
bad-faith litigants, but even these procedural sanctions are not sufficiently
high120 and they are often reversed in the appellate courts, which review
them de novo.121 Such features cause a low level of deterrence, allowing an
undesirable lack of candor. Additionally, there are no pre-trial out-of-court
attorney-led depositions, but only much shorter inquiries by the judge at
trial.122 This process may be useful to prove a party’s case, but rarely
uncovers previously unknown information. Finally, it is unusual for

115. See id. 30(d)(1) (“a deposition is limited to 1 day of 7 hours”). In hours of inquiry,
exploring contradictions the witness and her fear of committing perjury, an American attorney may
discover substantial information that would not surface otherwise.
116. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11, 37; see, e.g., Brian D. Burgoon, The Bar’s Procedure for
Investigating and Prosecuting Disciplinary Complaints, FLA. BAR NEWS (Feb. 1, 2014),
http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/jnnews01.nsf/cb53c80c8fabd49d85256b5900678f6c/aed382f8a
be1ac7385257c670048bb12!OpenDocument.
117.

Observations based on anecdotal experience, as a Judge in Brazil.

118.

CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL [C.P.C.] art. 447, § 2, II de 3.2016 (Braz.).

119. See generally C.P.C.; see also [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 5, LXVII (Braz.) (“there shall
be no civil imprisonment for debt, except for a person who voluntarily and inexcusably defaults on a
support obligation”).
120. C.P.C. art. 81 (Braz.) (a fine between 1 and 10% of the amount in controversy, plus
proven damages and attorney’s fees incurred by the other party, costs that, in Brazil, are usually not high
enough to deter bad-faith litigation).
121.

C.P.C. arts. 1012–13; see also Pritsch, supra note 64 at 60.

122. C.P.C. arts. 450–53. In the labor courts’ procedure, parties may hear three witnesses each,
in a schedule that usually will contain three to five trials in a same afternoon. Id.; Decreto No. 5.452, de
1 de Maio de 1943, CONSOLIDAÇÃO DAS LEIS DO TRABALHO [C.L.T.] art. 821 de 01.05.1943 (Braz.)
Thus, witnesses may be heard in as little as five minutes or up to an hour in extreme cases. This system,
thus, does not allow attorneys to use witnesses to uncover new information, but only to present to the
judge evidence to support their case. See C.P.C. arts. 450–53.
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attorneys to be sanctioned for litigation misconduct directly by the
respective judge, who may report it to the Bar.123
Considering these differences in the truth-finding process in both
countries, one may understand why Brazil has not yet had many gender
discrimination cases, where evidence is usually scarce and in the
employer’s possession. For instance, it is unlikely that a sex-based
stereotyping case as Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins124 would be successfully
litigated in Brazil. In Hopkins, remarks of the employer’s partners—that
the plaintiff had to take “a course at charm school,” or to dress femininely
and wear makeup—were key to the courts.125 Similar were the partners’
evaluations describing her as “macho” or suggesting that she was
“overcompensated for being a woman.” 126 In Brazil, relying on probable
impunity, employers would likely withhold or deny the existence of
documents containing such damaging statements.
C. Smaller Judgment Awards in Brazil May Not Outweigh the Litigation
Costs of the More Complex Discrimination Cases
Another factor that might contribute to the low numbers of gender
discrimination litigation in Brazil is the lower amount of judgment awards
in comparison to the United States. These lower judgments provide lesser
incentives to litigate the more complex discrimination cases. For instance,
in RR 11184048.2007.5.05.0020, the court voided the for-cause discharge
of an employee with pregnancy complications, which had been harassed
because of her condition and later discharged based on pre-textual

123. There is a trend, based on the language of the C.P.C. enacted in 2016, art. 77, paragraph 6
(parties and attorneys have a duty to faithfully comply with judicial orders and to not create obstacles to
compliance) to make attorneys jointly liable to pay for bad-faith litigation fines. C.P.C. art. 77.
However, attorney discipline in Brazil is still a question to be treated exclusively by the Bar. Id.
124. Plaintiff Ann Hopkins was a senior manager at Price Waterhouse accounting partnership
when she was considered for partnership, in 1982. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 228
(1989). Because her candidacy was put on hold for reconsideration, and because in the following year
she was not reconsidered for partnership, she sued under Title VII charging that she had been
discriminated against on the basis of sex. Id. The District Court found for the plaintiff, reasoning that
the employer made such decisions consciously giving effect to partners' evaluations based on sex
stereotyping, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. The Supreme Court held that that when a plaintiff
proves that gender was a motivating factor of the decision, defendant may avoid liability by showing by
a preponderance of the evidence it would make the same decision irrespective of the plaintiff's gender.
Id. at 260. The Court reversed and remanded only because the lower courts had decided that defendant
had to make such proof by clear and convincing evidence. Id.
125.

Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 233, 256.

126.

Id. at 233.
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negligence. 127 The appellate court found that the employer’s harassment
was intended to coerce her to waive pregnancy tenure by resignation, and
awarded her $50,000 in damages and back pay.128 The highest labor court
(T.S.T.) doubled the back pay, recognizing that her discharge was
discriminatory.129 While statistics as to the judgment and settlement awards
for gender discrimination in Brazil are not available, this author’s own
experience shows that this case is on the higher end of the spectrum.
In contrast, in the United States, such an award would be on the lower
end. According to the search engine Westlaw Next, there were 430 sexual
harassment cases with judgments or settlements up to $50,000.130
However, such search engine listed 1,389 cases which had judgments or
settlements above that amount, including 105 cases between $1–2 million,
78 cases between $2–5 million, and 44 cases over $5 million.131 For
instance, in Ingraham v. UBS Fin. Servs., the company retaliated against an
employee and eventually discharged her after she complained about being
sexually harassed by her superior.132 The jury awarded her $350,000
damages on the sexual harassment claim, $242,000 damages on the
retaliation claim, as well as an additional $10,000,000 in punitive damages
on the retaliation claim.133
D. Limitations of the Current Statutory Text and the Lack of Binding
Precedent in Brazil
In Brazil, another factor that hinders the development of gender
discrimination litigation might be its more limited statutory protection in
relation to the United States, and the lack of binding effect of case law. In
comparing the anti-discrimination statutory provisions in Brazil and the
United States, one may notice that the Brazilian legislation provides a

127. RR 11184048.2007.5.05.0020, Relator: Min. Alexandre Agra Belmonte, TRIBUNAL
S UPERIOR DO TRABALHO J URISPRUDÊNCIA [T.S.T.J.] de 13.11.2013 (Braz.), https://consultortrabalhista.
com/decisoes-trabalhistas/tst-embargos-de-declaracao-em-recurso-de-revista-empregada-gestantedispen
sa-discriminatoria-percepca/.
128.

Id.

129. Id.; Lei 9.029, de 13 de Abril de 1995, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] art. 4 de
13.4.1995 (Braz.) (citing Brazilian law awards doubled back pay when an unlawful discharge results
from discrimination); see Labor & Employment Jury Verdicts & Settlements, WESTLAW NEXT (Apr. 18,
2015).
130.

Labor & Employment Jury Verdicts & Settlements, see supra note 129.

131.

Id.

132. See generally Verdict and Settlement Summary, Ingraham v. UBS Fin. Servs., 2011 WL
232381 (Mo. Cir.).
133.

Id.
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narrower scope of protection, even though it does not limit the protected
classes to the expressly listed ones.134 The Brazilian statutes on point are
less detailed than Title VII and do not expressly mention any equivalent to
a disparate impact theory of employment discrimination. 135 That might be
the reason why the cases that reach the Brazilian courts are either the ones
literally covered in some statutory provision (often not requiring
discriminatory intent), or the ones involving obvious discrimination. 136
Additionally, even though Brazilian judges may interpret and apply
the existing provisions in creative manners, as the circumstances require,137
such decisions have had a smaller reach because they were usually not
binding on lower courts.138 In contrast, the United States’ judicial decisions
have a strong impact on shaping social behavior, as they bind lower judges
for future cases, advising society of what is legal and what is not. These
decisions receive significant public attention and sometimes even provoke
the intervention of the legislator.139 Employment discrimination case law
has added many layers to the Title VII provisions, to the point that
134.

See supra note 136–43 and accompanying text.

135.

See supra Part II, Section B.

136. See supra notes 106–12 and accompanying text.
For example, in RR
106240071.2005.5.09.0005, the T.S.T. affirmed the regional decision finding that the discharge of an
employee because of her family responsibilities with her young child, was discriminatory. RR No.
106240071.2005.5.09.0005, Relator: Min. Fernando Eizo Ono, TRIBUNAL S UPERIOR DO TRABALHO
JURISPRUDÊNCIA [T.S.T.J.] de 30.11.2011, https://consultortrabalhista.com/decisoes-trabalhistas/tstembargos-de-declaracao-em-recurso-de-revista-empregada-gestante-dispensa-discriminatoria-percepca/
(reasoning that the employer dismissed the complaint based on the unsupported assumption that her
performance could be compromised by motherhood, unfairly withdrawing her means of support in the
moment most needed). The court affirmed the reinstatement of the employee even though the period of
job security due to pregnancy had already lapsed, finding that the real issue was the discriminatory
motivation of the discharge based on her family status. Id. Family status is an expressly protected class.
See Lei No. 9.029, de 13 de Abril de 1995, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] art. 1, 17.4.1995
(Braz.).
137. “[I]n Brazil it is not possible to find entire bodies of law created by judges in the vacuum
of statutory rules, such as in the common law countries.” See Pritsch, supra note 64 at 91. However,
“[t]he French Revolution’s dogma that the Judiciary branch should only apply—and not interpret—the
law designed by the Legislative branch has long been proven impracticable and abandoned. Id.
“[J]udges are expected to ensure full normative force to the constitutional principles, using them to fill
statutory gaps, to interpret the existing statutes, or to find those statutes unconstitutional. Id. (citing
Barroso, supra note 14, at 356).
138. Pritsch, supra note 64 at 85. That has traditionally been the rule in Brazil. However, to
reduce the massive overburden on the courts, judicial reforms in the last years have progressively
introduced binding precedents. Such trend may dramatically increase after 2016, when a new Code of
Civil procedure came into effect, attributing binding effect to en banc decisions and to some other
important types of precedents. Id. All panel decided cases, however, remain as merely persuasive
precedent. See id.
139.

See, e.g., THE CIV. RIGHTS ACT of 1991.
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employment discrimination outgrew employment law, being offered as a
separate course at law schools and earning separate casebooks. 140
This richness of information in American employment discrimination
law likely provides better guidance about the law and litigation perspectives
to employers, employees and legal professionals, in sharp contrast to the
course this type of law has been taking in Brazil. Part of this situation may
change due to the new Brazilian Code of Civil Procedure, effective in
March 2016, which has introduced in the Brazilian legal system a binding
effect to some types of appellate decisions.141 As it happens in the United
States, with time, the judicial resolution of concrete cases tends to enrich
the existing law, offering added guidance to prospective parties and legal
professionals. Nevertheless, more has to be done to reduce gender
discrimination in Brazil, as this paper discusses in Part V.
V.

WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT? NEW LEGISLATION, PUBLIC PROSECUTORS’
INVESTIGATIONS, AND INFORMATION CAMPAIGNS

In light of the shortcomings described above, this article proposes
three actions to help reduce gender discrimination in Brazil using the
corresponding judicial remedies: the enactment of new legislation, the
increased use of the public prosecutors’ investigatory powers, and
information campaigns.
As to statutory change, the prospective legislation mentioned in Part
II-C could be a good alternative. It provides more detailed and complete
treatment of workplace discrimination, including an equivalent to the
disparate impact theory142 and workplace bullying,143 affirmative actions,144
and policies for balanced family responsibilities. 145
It also deters
discrimination by the denial of public financing and publication of a
discriminatory employer’s list,146 and creates equality commissions within
each mid-size and large employer. 147 Such statutory scheme, along with the
forthcoming introduction of binding precedents in Brazil would create tools
to litigate gender discrimination more akin to the ones available in the

140.

See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).

141.

CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL [C.P.C.] art. 489, § 1, VI, art. 927 de 16.3.2015 (Braz).

142.
(Braz.)

Lei No. 6.653, de 15 de Dezembro de 2009, PROJETO DE LEI [P.L.] art. 4. de 16.12.2009

143.

Id. art. 27.

144.

Id. art. 2, ¶ 3, art. 3.

145.

Id. art. 5.

146.

Id. arts. 23–24.

147.

Lei No. 6.653, P.L. art. 34 (Braz.).
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American legal system. 148 That could increase the numbers and efficacy of
gender discrimination litigation in Brazil.
Another possible course of action could be the increased focus of
public prosecutors in the area of gender discrimination. The Brazilian law
grants prosecutors, even in civil matters, special investigatory powers not
held by private attorneys. 149 Public prosecutors’ requests for documents
are equivalent to a court order, subjecting a noncompliant party to
prosecution for criminal contempt.150 Additionally, prosecutors may
subpoena a witness for an out-of-court deposition under oath, a power also
not held by private attorneys in Brazil.151 Therefore, the odds of
uncovering a specific employer’s acts or policies showing a disparate
impact, as well as obtaining any damaging documents, are much greater
through public prosecutors. Possessing such information, prosecutors may
have leverage to enter into a consent decree with such employer or to
prosecute a successful class action.152
Finally, educational campaigns reaching employees and employers
could improve awareness about what constitutes gender discrimination and
its legal consequences. The rarity of litigation, despite considerable gender
discrimination in Brazil, shows the limitations of the current system. The
mere existence of anti-discrimination law has not been enough to change
the workplace culture. It has not placed possible plaintiff-employees on
notice of all forms of discrimination. These employees might not even
recognize some forms of discrimination, such as seeing as acceptable the
discretionary promotion of men at much higher rates than those of
women.153
Additionally, the mere existence of the current antidiscrimination legislation has not been sufficient to change employers’
attitudes towards gender discrimination. Most employers do not even know
how to deal with the issue of gender discrimination. 154

148.

See id. art. 5.

149. Lei Complementar No. 75, de 20 de Maio de 1993, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.]
art. 8, II, IV, § 3, de 21.5.1995 (Braz.).
150.

Id. art. 8, II, IV, § 3.

151.

Id. art. 8, I, IX, § 3.

152. Sérgio P. Marçal & Lucas Pinto Simão, Brazil: The Class Actions Law Review – Edition
1, L. REVS. (May 2017), http://thelawreviews.co.uk/edition/the-class-actions-law-review-edition1/1141375/brazil (explaining that Brazilian class actions may not be filed by individual class
representatives, but only by associations, unions, public defender’s office, government or prosecutors).
153. Telephone Interview with Fabiano Holz Beserra, then Chief-Prosecutor of the
Procuradoria Regional do Trabalho da 4ª Região [Labor Prosecutors’ Office for the 4th Region] (Mar. 9,
2015).
154.

See supra Part III, Section B.
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Gender equality could be improved through education. Campaigns
about the promotion of gender equality and the corresponding legal tools to
enforce it could be promoted by the Brazilian Ministry of Labor, the
Prosecutor’s Office, the Judiciary, unions, and all organizations and
agencies involved in the promotion of equality in the workplace. This
could disseminate and increase the information about gender discrimination
as well as contribute decisively to the enforcement of anti-discrimination
laws in Brazil.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Even though workplace rights in Brazil have prominence, employment
discrimination litigation is almost nonexistent, in sharp contrast to what
happens in the United States. Why is that so? The problem of gender
discrimination in Brazil does exist, despite its anti-discrimination laws.
Brazil does have constitutional and statutory provisions that promote
equality and explicitly outlaw discrimination at the workplace, including
gender discrimination. However, employment discrimination claims in
Brazilian federal courts are eight times less than in the United States, and
gender discrimination claims are twenty-five times less than in the United
States.155 That does not mean that, in Brazil, discrimination on the basis of
gender is less of a problem than in the United States. Women in Brazil earn
only 73.7% compared to men, despite being more educated than men.156 In
the United States, that ratio is 81%.157 Within this scenario, this paper
proposes four explanations for the relatively lower numbers of gender
discrimination suits in Brazil.
First, cases in the United States that would be litigated as employment
discrimination claims may be brought in Brazil under more straightforward
causes of action, without the daunting task of showing discriminatory
intent. For example, in the United States, sexual harassment due to an
abusive work environment must be “severe or pervasive” from an objective
and subjective standpoint.158 Additionally, it must affect the conditions of
employment because of the plaintiff’s sex. 159 In Brazil, abusive work
environment harassment is illegal per se, regardless of the relation to the
victim’s gender. 160 In addition, a Brazilian pregnant woman has tenure
until five months after birth or else she will be entitled to choose
155.

See supra notes 64–72 and accompanying text.

156.

See supra notes 74–78 and accompanying text.

157.

See supra note 77 and accompanying text.

158.

See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993).

159.

Id.

160.

See supra note 99–102 and accompanying text.
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reinstatement and back pay, or the wages and benefits of the entire tenure
period.161 Even though the proof of discriminatory intent to the discharge
may double the back pay amount, it is not essential to prove it, as it is in the
United States.162
Second, the lack of more aggressive truth-finding procedures such as
those available in the United States makes it more difficult to prove
discrimination cases in Brazil. As a result, unless there is a “smoking gun”
piece of evidence, discrimination cases are rarely litigated. In the United
States, discovery procedures for the request of documents, interrogatories,
and depositions are enforceable by harsh procedural sanctions, contempt of
court, perjury prosecutions, and by attorney disciplinary procedures
prosecuted by the Bar before the courts. 163 In Brazil, there is less
enforcement of the truth-finding process, as successful perjury convictions
of witnesses are rare, and there is no imprisonment for contempt of court. 164
Sanctions are lower than in the United States, and Brazilian judges may not
directly apply them to attorneys, whose exclusive disciplinary forum is the
Bar, without supervision by the courts.165 All of this lowers deterrence and
allows for an undesirable lack of candor or withholding of damaging
documents. Further, because there are no depositions, but only shorter
testimonies heard at trial, they are less likely to uncover all of the necessary
facts.166
Third, another factor that might contribute to the low numbers of
gender discrimination litigation in Brazil is the significantly lower value of
judgment awards in relation to the United States. 167 This likely provides
insufficient incentives to litigate the more complex gender discrimination
cases in Brazil. For instance, while a $50,000 judgment for gender
discrimination in Brazil would be at the higher end of the spectrum, in the
United States such an award would be in the lower end. Most of the
judgments or settlements in such cases exceed $50,000, and many surpass
$2–5 million.168
Fourth, the more limited statutory protection in Brazil, compared to
the United States, and the lack of binding effect of case law, hinder the
development of gender discrimination litigation. The Brazilian legislation
provides a narrower scope of protection, despite its non-exhaustive
161.

See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text.

162.

See supra note 112, 136 and accompanying text.

163.

See supra note 116 and accompanying text.

164.

See supra notes 117–20 and accompanying text.

165.

See supra note 123 and accompanying text.

166.

See supra note 122 and accompanying text.

167.

See supra notes 127–33 and accompanying text.

168.

See supra notes 130–33 and accompanying text.
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protected class list.169 The Brazilian provisions are less detailed than Title
VII, and do not expressly outlaw disparate impact discrimination. 170
Additionally, judicial decisions in Brazil are usually not binding on lower
courts.171 Therefore, they do not add new layers to anti-discrimination
provisions in the way that the United States Supreme Court’s decisions
have done for the past few decades. 172 As a result, the American
employment discrimination law likely provides better guidance about the
law and litigation perspectives to employers, employees and legal
professionals. That may change, in part, when the new Brazilian Code of
Civil Procedure became effective, after March 2016, introducing into the
Brazilian legal system a binding effect to all appellate case law.173
As possible courses of action to address such problems, this paper
proposes the enactment of new legislation, the increased use of the
Brazilian public prosecutors’ special investigatory powers, and information
campaigns.
There is a bill waiting to be voted on at the Brazilian Congress since
2009, which could be a good alternative. It provides a more comprehensive
treatment of workplace discrimination, regulating in some detail disparate
impact, workplace bullying, affirmative actions and family responsibilities
policies, and creating equality commissions within each mid-size and large
employer.174 Along with binding precedents recently introduced into
Brazilian law, the enactment of such bill could provide a better legal
support for gender discrimination litigation in Brazil.
As to public prosecutors, the Brazilian law grants them special
investigatory powers not held by private attorneys—they may order the
production of documents and subpoena witnesses for an out-of-court
deposition under oath. 175 Their likelihood of uncovering, for example, a
specific employer’s acts or policies that generate disparate impact, or of
obtaining key documents held by the employer, is much greater than that of
private attorneys. Therefore, the focus of public prosecutors in gender
discrimination claims could be very useful to increase gender equality in
Brazil.
Finally, the educational campaigns reaching employees and employers
could improve awareness about what constitutes gender discrimination and
its legal consequences. The mere existence of the anti-discrimination law
169.

See supra note 134 and accompanying text.

170.

See supra note 135 and accompanying text.

171.

See Pritsch supra note 64, at 85 and accompanying text.

172.

See supra note 137–40 and accompanying text.

173.

See Pritsch supra note 64, at 85 and accompanying text.

174.

See supra notes 142–48 and accompanying text.

175.

See supra notes 149–52 and accompanying text.
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has not been enough to change the workplace culture. Employees often do
not recognize some forms of gender discrimination, and most employers do
not even know how to deal with the issue. Campaigns about the promotion
of gender equality and the corresponding legal tools to enforce it could
disseminate and increase the relevant information and contribute decisively
to the enforcement of the anti-discrimination laws in Brazil.

